Computational Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act

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Abstract

In recent years, computers have been used to generate ensembles of districting plans: collections of large numbers of electoral maps that are used to assess a proposed map in the context of valid alternatives. Ensemble-based outlier analysis has played a central role in recent redistricting disputes, especially regarding partisan gerrymandering. Until now, methods for generating these ensembles have enforced districting rules that are relatively simple to assess, such as population equality, but have not contended with more complex ones, such as the prohibitions against racial gerrymandering and minority vote dilution that flow from the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. We take up the task of building ensembles of plans that respect those legal constraints. Rather than relying on demographic data alone, our method uses precinct-level returns from a large collection of recent primary and general elections. With this electoral history, we build effectiveness scores that identify districts where members of minority groups have had realistic opportunities to nominate and elect their preferred candidates. In a case study of Texas congressional districts, we find that detailed election data is indispensable to assessing a map’s effectiveness for minority voters. Purely demographic targets, such as demanding some specific number of majority-minority districts, not only raise constitutional concerns but also are poor proxies for empirical effectiveness. Our study also considers the use of algorithmic search methods to dramatically increase minority electoral opportunities. In Texas, for example, the current enacted plan has 11 of 36 congressional districts that are effective for either Latino or Black voters. We find that better mapmaking could raise that number to 15 or 16 without sacrificing traditional principles such as contiguity or compactness, nearly eliminating the historic underrepresentation of both groups throughout the state.

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1 Introduction

Today, only 107 Representatives in Congress—fewer than a quarter of all House members—belong to a racial or language minority group.\textsuperscript{1} If those groups were represented in proportion to their share of the Nation’s adult citizen population, that number would increase to 144 Representatives.\textsuperscript{2} And this sub-proportional representation is not confined to Congress, but is replicated today in 47 of the 50 state legislatures.\textsuperscript{3} Conventional wisdom asserts that this shortfall in minority representation is an inevitable consequence of entrenched patterns of racial polarization in housing and voting.

\textsuperscript{1}Bialik (2019). This figure refers to the 116th Congress (2019–2021).
\textsuperscript{2}This figure is based on data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2019a).
\textsuperscript{3}See U.S. Bureau of the Census (2019b); National Conference of State Legislatures (2020).
That conclusion now appears to be wrong. The culprit, in significant part, is redistricting. Computer-generated ensembles—collections of thousands of alternative maps—show that better-designed redistricting plans could close much (though not all) of that gap and ensure that the House of Representatives and state legislatures “look more like America” than at any time in our history.

The technology to study this issue comprehensively did not exist as recently as a decade ago, when the 50 states last redistricted. Since then, algorithmic innovation and steadily improving computational power have revolutionized our ability to understand the variety of valid redistricting plans. It is now possible to generate millions of distinct, plausible plans on a laptop overnight. That in turn allows any plan—including one enacted by a state—to be compared not to a mere handful of maps drawn on paper or on a screen, but to a large and diverse ensemble of plans.

Not surprisingly, this innovation has come to dominate some types of redistricting litigation in the last few years, especially lawsuits claiming that a districting plan is excessively partisan. But until now, ensemble methods have not seriously grappled with issues of race in redistricting. And these tend to be the most heavily litigated issues in the field, due to the demands imposed by the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The legal rules addressing race in redistricting are much more complex than, say, the “one person, one vote” doctrine in federal constitutional law, or the contiguity requirements in state constitutional law. Modeling the racial rules is far from straightforward.

This Article takes up that task. First, we develop methods that incorporate the legal rules involving the consideration of race in redistricting into the algorithms that generate redistricting ensembles. Second, we show that the methods used to accomplish that task can also be used to draw maps that increase opportunities for minority groups to elect candidates of their choice. As it turns out, there is the potential to provide much more opportunity, at least in some states, than was previously recognized. In short, the algorithmic creation of redistricting ensembles holds the promise of not only sharpening our understanding of redistricting choices and tradeoffs, but also better fostering the aims of the Voting Rights Act, “a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics” (Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1020).

Toward that end, one of our strongest findings deserves particular emphasis. In the past, the dominant method of looking for effective minority districts has been to use demographics as a proxy, such as by seeking majority-Black districts to secure effective electoral opportunities for Black voters. But in our case studies, demographic share alone is a poor proxy for effectiveness; relying too heavily on demographics could inadvertently disempower minority citizens by packing them into too few districts.

Section 2 of this Article reviews the burgeoning science of redistricting ensembles. Section 3 summarizes the legal rules governing the consideration of race and racial data in redistricting. Section 4 sets forth a concrete protocol for building VRA-conscious ensembles using recent election data to generate effectiveness scores that rate each district’s likelihood of nominating and electing minority-preferred candidates. Section 5 applies our VRA-conscious ensemble protocol to congressional redistricting in Texas, where both Latino and Black residents are numerous enough to require VRA attention. Section 6 applies techniques from statistics and machine learning to the Texas results to show the importance of using detailed electoral data when building VRA-conscious ensembles. And Section 7 concludes with a striking proof of concept showing that the long-standing underrepresentation of minority voters in Texas, far from being an immutable fact, can be addressed through proactive mapmaking.
2 Ensemble methods: algorithms for creating districting plans

As Justice Kagan explained in her dissent in *Rucho v. Common Cause* (2019, 2517–23), a computer equipped with an algorithm that generates a huge number of redistricting plans could potentially create a baseline to help answer questions like:

- What is an extreme, or unfair, number of Republican (or Democratic) districts, given the partisan composition and political geography of the state’s voters? or,
- What would be a typical number of competitive districts, given those same parameters? or,
- Given the new census data, can a plan comply with the “one person, one vote” principle without pairing two incumbents’ homes in the same district?

And as we will soon demonstrate, an ensemble approach also can help us address questions like:

- What is a fair map for Latino and Black voters?

2.1 Illustrative example: Iowa

The algorithmic creation of diverse ensembles of redistricting plans can be extraordinarily useful. To see this, let’s consider the case of Iowa. According to the 2010 census, Iowa’s 99 counties contained 216,007 census blocks and 3,046,355 residents—enough for four congressional districts.

If we used the finest pixels for redistricting, our task would be to assign the 216,007 census blocks to four contiguous districts, with each block ending up in one and only one district. But Iowa’s constitution simplifies the problem by mandating that “no county shall be divided in forming a congressional district,” so drawing our four districts only requires assigning the 99 counties (Iowa Const. art. III, § 37). We might hope to approach the question of finding fair plans by first building all the plans, and comparing a particular plan to the full set.

That approach, however, fails. Even this modest problem of dividing 99 counties into four connected parts (four contiguous districts) is currently out of reach: no one has yet been able to find a precise answer for this problem by computer, even with a clever enumeration algorithm and a month of computing time. Indeed, even for the somewhat smaller problem on a $9 \times 9$ grid, there are over 700 trillion solutions.\(^4\)

This problem is only compounded in most states, which build their districts from census blocks (on average, there are more than 2,000 blocks per county). The full enumeration is subject to what is called *combinatorial explosion*, and the associated counting problem has forbidding complexity. This means not only that we lack the computing power to enumerate all plans today, but that computers likely will never be able to do so.

A second issue is that most plans in a complete enumeration would be irrelevant to the practical problem of redistricting because they would be blatantly unlawful. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The plan on the left, in which the biggest district has more than 750 times the population of the smallest one, would patently violate the “one person, one vote” doctrine. A district-to-district population difference greater than 10% of the ideal district size is presumptively unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment; and for congressional districts, the standard is far stricter, under Article I of the Constitution (*Brown v. Thomson*, 1983, 842–48; *Karcher v. Daggett*, 1983, 730–44). This means that districting plans with large population inequalities are of no practical interest, so a useful ensemble should exclude them.

\(^4\)To be precise, there are 706,152,947,468,301 ways to partition a $9 \times 9$ grid into nine districts of nine units each. See mggg.org/table.html.
These two partitions of Iowa into four connected pieces are not plausible for adoption as districting plans. The first has nearly all the state’s population in a single large (green) district. The second more closely balances each district’s population, but would likely violate Iowa law’s compactness requirement.

The map on the right has much better population balance, but it also falls outside the plausible zone for plans. Its G-shaped district (“G” for gerrymandering) flaunts the mapmaker’s disrespect for the traditional districting principle of compactness, which Iowa law strictly safeguards (Iowa Code § 42.4.4).

Interestingly, even after prohibiting unequally populated, discontiguous, and highly noncompact districts, and even using whole counties rather than census blocks to build districts, we find that the problem of generating all possible plans is still computationally intractable. So we must shift our focus from complete enumeration to a more attainable goal: building a representative sample of plans from the full space of possibilities. By appealing to this sample, we can hope to address questions of partisan fairness, competitiveness, racial fairness, and all the other concerns and values we bring to bear on redistricting.

To illustrate this methodology, we generated a sample of 100,000 valid Iowa congressional maps by the recombination method explained below in §4.1, without taking partisan data into account. This lets us compare the enacted plan against these alternatives. We will use the votes cast for President in the November 2016 election, in which Trump won roughly 55% of the major-party vote to Clinton’s 45%. By tallying the Trump and Clinton votes in each district in each plan we generated, we can learn about the tendencies for partisan breakdown by district. To summarize the findings, let us label a district “competitive” in this contest if both candidates received between 45% and 55% of the (major party) vote; all districts where the winner got more than 55% are labeled “safe.” In our ensemble of compact, contiguous, population-balanced plans, nearly 75% have one safe Republican seat and three competitive seats; over 25% have two safe Republican seats and two competitive seats; and only 46 out of 100,000 plans have any other breakdown. The current enacted plan has one heavily Trump-favoring district and three competitive ones, putting it in the largest category. This does not tell us by any stretch that the current plan is ideal or fair, but it does tell us that this plan is not an outlier by this way of measuring partisanship. This illustrates an elementary use of ensembles to benchmark partisan lean and competitiveness.

Similarly, ensembles can help us study how plans made without regard to race might tend to distribute a state’s minority populations across districts, merely as a function of human geography. This racial baseline has been studied in a range of reports and papers, including (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2018d,a, 2019b,a; DeFord and Duchin, 2019; Duchin and Spencer, 2020). But exploring the distribution of racial-group members in an ensemble is a different task from building
2.2 Building ensembles


Past ensemble methods used in litigation have focused on generating plans while controlling population balance, contiguity, compactness, and sometimes county and municipality integrity. Generating large ensembles while controlling for these legitimate districting criteria helped judges decide whether one political party’s disproportionate successes were due to the state’s geographic features and the distribution of its voters—or to partisan manipulation of district lines. But in building their ensembles, the experts who testified in these cases did not seriously grapple with the legal requirements involving the consideration of race in redistricting.

In the Wisconsin case, for example, Democratic plaintiffs brought partisan-gerrymandering claims against a state Assembly plan that had resulted in Republicans winning 60 or more of the 99 seats, even in elections where Democratic candidates collectively received more total votes than their Republican counterparts. In work prepared for the litigation and described in the subsequent article (Chen, 2017), political scientist Jowei Chen built an ensemble of alternative Assembly plans to help evaluate the enacted plan and to demonstrate that the heavy advantage that Republicans enjoyed under that plan did not result inevitably from the political geography of the state’s voters. Chen generated an ensemble of plans that altered boundaries for 92 of the 99 districts, while “freezing” seven heavily minority districts in and around Milwaukee, one of which had been ordered into effect to remedy a VRA violation.

Likewise, in the North Carolina cases, the experts’ ensembles relied on proxies for districts’ effectiveness for minority voters. For example, consider the work of one plaintiffs’ expert, mathematician Jonathan Mattingly, as described in a subsequent article by his research group (Herschlag et al., 2020). Mattingly’s work in North Carolina used demographic targets of 44.48% and 36.20% Black population for two congressional districts—the precise levels found in the enacted plan that the plaintiffs were challenging. He then built an ensemble by iterating a random step biased to favor plans that hit those demographic targets. In addition to the effects of this tilted search, he discarded plans that fell short of those targets from the final ensemble presented in court, so that the prescribed population levels served as a minimum for all included plans.

In the context of these mid-decade partisan-gerrymandering cases, the experts’ decisions to de-emphasize VRA complexities were understandable. The litigation, after all, focused on party, not race, and lawful VRA-compliant districts were already in place. But at the beginning of a new decade, with fresh census results available, that option will be foreclosed, as the minority districts from the previous map will have become either over- or under-populated due to population shifts and will thus violate “one person, one vote.” So the minority districts (like all other districts) will have to be redrawn to accommodate the new census data. When generating alternative plans to

Mattingly’s method used a search procedure weighted to favor plans with better scores, based on a combination of population balance, compactness, county integrity, and nearness to his demographic targets for Black population.
create a baseline for comparison, redistricters will need to account for the delicate legal requirements imposed by the VRA and the Constitution.

For techniques that have been implemented to build VRA requirements into redistricting ensembles, the literature review is brief. The final example that we know appears in a forthcoming *Yale Law Journal* article called *The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights* (Chen and Stephanopoulos, 2020). In this piece, Jowei Chen and legal scholar Nick Stephanopoulos take the problem of identifying a suitable VRA district head-on, defining a minority opportunity district by using a combination of partisan data (returns from the 2012 presidential general election) and demographic data (voting-age population from the 2010 census). In particular, they define a minority opportunity district to be one in which (1) the candidate of choice (typically Obama) carried the district in the general election and (2) most of the candidate’s support is estimated to have come from minority voters. This is somewhat closer in spirit to the method proposed here, though this Article draws dramatically different conclusions from theirs.6

Our method for measuring district effectiveness, described in §4 below, will draw on a much larger collection of recent elections, pairing a primary with every general. The outcomes from these elections are the essential components of our effectiveness scores. And in §6 we will show that the scores we develop cannot be well approximated by considering only a district’s partisan lean and demographics.

2.3 Using ensembles

As we develop techniques for building VRA-conscious ensembles, there are two important general caveats about how and how not to use these ensembles.

Comparison, not selection. Our protocol is not designed to simulate the nuanced judgment of a seasoned voting-rights attorney. Rather, as we generate a chain of thousands of maps, we need a fast and reliable rough cut for VRA compliance. Our protocol uses a random iterative process in which districting plans are proposed, weighed, and potentially accepted into our ensemble of plans. We will be designing an in-or-out criterion that can be assessed in a fraction of a second. It is too much to expect perfection in excluding all unlawful maps and including all lawful ones, partly because the law itself is hardly a bright-line field. For example, even what seems like a rule with a clear threshold, such as the constitutional prohibition against state-legislative plans with population deviations greater than 10%, has exceptions in case law (*Cox v. Larios*, 2004; *Unger v. Manchin*, 2002). Nonetheless, an ensemble that includes a good share of the lawful maps that are proposed in the chain and rejects a good share of the unlawful ones will suffice for our goals of comparison and benchmarking. Ensembles should not be regarded as supplies of plans ready for immediate adoption without extensive human vetting.

Normal range, not ideal. We advocate using redistricting ensembles to learn a normal range for metrics and measures under the constraints of a set of stated redistricting rules and priorities. Ensembles allow us to justify statements such as Plan X is an outlier in its partisan lean, taking all relevant rules into account. We should talk about normal ranges and outliers, while avoiding the temptation to valorize the top of the bell curve (or its center of mass, or any other value) as an ideal. By analogy, we can talk about people who are unusually tall or short without believing that any height is most desirable or ideal. If the 50th percentile height for American women is 5’4” and

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6For their method’s details, see the full description in (Chen and Stephanopoulos, 2020). For a critique of their definition of minority opportunity districts and its application, see (Duchin and Spencer, 2020).
the 99th percentile height is 5’10”, we can conclude that a woman who is six feet tall is unusual, and we can look for reasons (family history, diet, and so on) to explain her height. But it would be quite strange to decide that a woman who is 5’4” is a “better” height than one who is 5’5”.

Justice Kagan’s Rucho dissent skirted the edge of this temptation. She mostly reasoned from ensembles just as we will recommend here, envisioning a bell curve (in that case, of partisan advantage) and describing plans far from the bulk of the curve as presumptively impermissible: “The further out on the tail, the more extreme the partisan distortion and the more significant the vote dilution” (Rucho v. Common Cause, 2019, 2518). But in the course of describing the outlier logic, she implied that plans “at or near the median” are the best of all. An outcome “smack dab in the center” (in Justice Kagan’s words) may not be in any sense the most fair, however. For instance, turning to the November 2012 Obama-Romney election as a touchpoint, Obama received nearly 53% of the major-party vote in Iowa. Even if just over half the congressional plans in our ensemble have three Obama-favoring districts out of four (making that the median outcome), we might still reasonably consider a map with two Obama-favoring and two Romney-favoring districts to have at least as strong a claim on fairness given the nearly even vote split.

Likewise, there would be no reason to prefer a map that preserves intact a median number of whole counties or municipalities. Indeed, some States’ redistricting laws expressly demand keeping counties or municipalities intact where practicable.

The same warning, to be wary of the magnetic attraction to the middle of a bell curve, surely applies as well to racial fairness. If a state’s Latino, Black, Asian-American, and Native American residents have historically been (and currently remain) underrepresented, we should gravitate toward solutions that fix the shortfall rather than perpetuate it. Fortunately, federal law pushes redistricters in the right direction.

3 The law of race and redistricting

The rules regarding the consideration of race in redistricting flow primarily from two sources of federal law: the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which Congress, exercising its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, enacted in 1965 and significantly revised in 1982.

3.1 The Voting Rights Act prohibits minority vote dilution

Section 2 of the VRA prohibits a redistricting plan that abridges any citizen’s right to vote “on account of race or color [or membership in a language-minority group]” (VRA, §§ 10301(a), 10301(f)(2)). Minority plaintiffs can establish a violation of amended Section 2 by showing, “based on the totality of circumstances,” that members of their racial or language-minority group “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate” to “nominat[e]” and “elect representatives of their choice” (VRA, § 10301(b)).

In assessing whether a redistricting plan provides equal electoral opportunity under amended Section 2, Congress expressly permitted state redistricters and federal judges alike to consider recent election outcomes, namely “[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office” (VRA, § 10301(b)). Nothing in Section 2, however, “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” While electoral success for minority candidates is important, even more important under Section 2 is that the candidate be the “chosen representative” of a particular racial or language-minority group, regardless of the candidate’s race or ethnicity (Thornburg v. Gingles, 1986, 68 (plurality opinion)). And Section 2’s lodestar is “equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success
for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race" (Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1014 n.11). As the Supreme Court has explained, “minority citizens are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which is not to be slighted in applying a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics” (Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1020).

In redistricting cases “the ultimate question [under Section 2] is whether a districting decision dilutes the votes of minority voters” (Abbott v. Perez, 2018, 2332). District lines can dilute the voting strength of politically cohesive minority-group members either by “cracking,” or dispersing, them among multiple districts where they are routinely outvoted by a bloc-voting majority or by “packing,” or concentrating, them into too few districts, wasting votes that could have mattered in neighboring districts (Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1007). Section 2 prohibits both packing and cracking whenever district lines combine with social and historical conditions to impair the minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates “on an equal basis with other voters” (Voinovich v. Quilter, 1993, 153).

In jurisdictions where all sizable demographic groups (majority and minority alike) consistently favor the same candidates, a redistricting plan cannot dilute minority citizens’ voting strength, so Section 2 plays no role (Thornburg v. Gingles, 1986, 51). But in most states, where voting is in varying degrees racially polarized, Section 2 can require replacing one or more districts that elect candidates preferred by the majority (usually, a White majority) with districts that would elect candidates preferred by one or more minority groups (Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1008). To prevail, Section 2 plaintiffs must prove that, under the challenged plan, a bloc-voting majority usually will defeat “candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group” (Thornburg v. Gingles, 1986, 49). But even with such proof, plaintiffs’ challenge to a state districting plan ordinarily will fail if the plan provides effective opportunities to nominate and elect minority-preferred candidates in a number of districts roughly proportional to the minority group’s share of the state’s citizen voting-age population, or CVAP (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 436–38; Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1000).

One particularly useful—and simple—method for assessing minority electoral opportunities under a districting plan is to add up the votes cast for each candidate in recent statewide primary and general elections by district, to learn which districts gave more votes to the minority-preferred candidate than to any other candidate (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 428 (majority opinion), 493–94, 499–501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting in part); Session v. Perry, 2004, 499–501). This approach is particularly straightforward if each precinct is kept intact within a single district: simply adding up the votes for each candidate in all of a district’s precincts shows, for each election, which candidate carried the district. The most difficult part of these analyses, especially in primaries, is identifying the candidate who was minority-preferred in each election, which is typically performed by a statistical-inference procedure comparing demographic patterns to voting patterns (King, 1997; King, Rosen and Tanner, 1999; Elmendorf, Quinn and Abrajano, 2016). But we will take care to place actual electoral history at the center of our assessment of district effectiveness, keeping the role of ecological inference to a minimum.

3.2 The Equal Protection Clause prohibits excessive attention to race

Regardless of what techniques are used to assess minority electoral opportunities, compliance with Section 2 necessarily requires detailed consideration of race and racial data. But a State’s consideration of race is constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment mandate that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 2017, 802). Starting in the 1990s in its Shaw
line of cases, the Supreme Court has identified at least two ways that the excessive use of race can give rise to a presumptively unconstitutional racial gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause (Miller v. Johnson, 1995, 904–05, 910–17; Shaw v. Reno, 1993).

First, a bizarrely noncompact district is subject to strict scrutiny under that Clause if the district’s boundary is “so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race” (Shaw v. Reno, 1993, 658). This type of racial predominance most often arises where a district’s perimeter is defined not by the boundaries of intact precincts, for which electoral data exists, but by the boundaries of (much smaller) census blocks that have been conspicuously sorted into or out of districts according to their racial composition (Hebert et al., 2010, 66–68 & n.21; Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 2015, 274).

Second, although only a minority of Justices have stated that the intentional creation of a majority-minority district should always be presumptively unconstitutional, the Court has held that districts violated the Equal Protection Clause because they were drawn to “maintain a particular numerical minority percentage” or to meet arbitrary or “mechanical racial targets,” such as a bald mandate that certain districts must have at least a 50% or a 55% Black voting-age population regardless of whether that percentage was actually shown to be necessary for the district to nominate and elect minority-preferred candidates (Cooper v. Harris, 2017, 1469; Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 2017, 799, 801–02; Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 2015, 267, 275; Bush v. Vera, 1996, 969–72).

3.3 Implications for redistricting ensembles

These legal points have major implications for an ensemble-creation protocol keyed to compliance with the VRA and the Constitution. As an initial matter, recalling the earlier point about ensembles being far more useful for comparison than for selection, the focus here is on drawing a collection of maps that have minimal vulnerability to challenge under VRA Section 2, rather than on crafting a map for plaintiffs to propose when suing the State.

As a gatekeeping function before ultimately assessing the “totality of circumstances,” courts generally require Section 2 plaintiffs to present an illustrative map showing that the minority group in question could constitute a literal arithmetic majority of the voting-age population (VAP) in a proposed district. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that a district that falls short of the 50% threshold yet can still nominate and elect minority-preferred candidates “can ... [and] should” count as a minority-effective district when assessing a State’s compliance with Section 2 (Bartlett v. Strickland, 2009, 24 (plurality opinion); see also Cooper v. Harris, 2017, 1470). So actual electoral opportunity for minority groups—a track record of effectiveness in elections—is what matters when defending a map against a VRA challenge.

Taken together, the legal points elucidated above in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 suggest three crucial design principles for a VRA-conscious ensemble protocol.

(1) **Ensure effectiveness in both primaries and generals.** Aiming to weed out of an ensemble plans that violate Section 2, while retaining plans that comply, a protocol must assess whether particular districts will or will not be effective for minority-preferred candidates seeking both nomination (in primaries) and election (in generals). This assessment requires

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7 See (Bartlett v. Strickland, 2009, 6, 9–11, 20, 24–25, 26 (plurality opinion)). Bartlett also may be satisfied with a majority of the proposed district’s citizen voting-age population (CVAP). And Bartlett’s 50% rule may not apply if the defendant drew the challenged districts with discriminatory intent, as might well be the case when a State dismantles an existing minority-effective district.
attention to both demographic data and actual election results, including precinct-level returns from primary and general elections.

(2) **Avoid a priori demographic targets.** Threshold decisions about the composition of districts should not be based on purely demographic targets—for example, requiring a certain number of districts that are at least, say, 55% Latino or 50% Black. That approach not only could lead to false positives or false negatives for district effectiveness, but could leave the methodology vulnerable to constitutional attack for excessive race-consciousness.

(3) **Maintain reasonable compactness.** To further reduce constitutional exposure, the ensemble-generating technique should admit few or no plans with bizarre district shapes.

We note that both the first and the third principles recommend the use of precincts, rather than the much smaller census blocks, when assembling districts. Precinct-based plans help to more accurately assess electoral history, which is fundamental to evaluating district effectiveness. The use of larger units bolsters compactness. And though they may not achieve perfect population equality, that fact presents no significant constitutional concerns.\(^8\)

4 **Design of a VRA-conscious ensemble protocol**

In this section, we will describe the design of a protocol for generating redistricting plans that comply not only with the criteria of population equality, contiguity, and reasonable compactness, but also the race-related rules mandated by the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause. It begins with data preparation and culminates in the use of a constrained recombination algorithm for generating plans that meet VRA-related requirements. We propose this as a sound and detailed VRA-conscious algorithm, but not as the authoritative VRA algorithm. There may well be other ways to incorporate the legal requirements around race, and to do it well. But the methods laid out in this section come closer to the big-picture goal—building a representative sample of lawful maps—than any previous work we know. We believe that this elaborated example of one concrete, reasonable way to take account of race and the law helps illuminate some key decisions.

We will use three main tools: a Markov chain procedure that proposes successive modifications to districting plans, precinct-level historical election data matched to demographics, and an enacted plan that has survived VRA scrutiny. With those tools we will define effective districts for minority groups, and we will describe how to set a threshold number of effective districts as an approximate test for VRA compliance.

4.1 **Building new plans by recombination**

The science of representative sampling has advanced greatly in the past few years, as ensemble methods have matured. Using a technique known as *Markov chain Monte Carlo* (MCMC), it is now possible to efficiently create an ensemble of thousands or millions, even billions, of maps. We can even sample while keeping control of the weighting that makes some kinds of plans appear

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\(^8\)Using whole precincts will rarely raise “one person, one vote” concerns for state-legislative maps. However, the Constitution imposes stricter population-equality standards for congressional maps (*Karcher v. Daggett*, 1983, 740-41). Although the most common current practice is to draw congressional plans so that the largest and smallest districts differ by only one person, the Supreme Court has upheld plans with significantly larger deviations (*Tennant v. Jefferson County Comm’n*, 2012, 762, 764–65; *Abrams v. Johnson*, 1997, 99–100). In any event, a map built from whole precincts can usually be readily modified into a map with a minimal deviation by swapping a limited number of census blocks between adjacent districts.
more often than others. For example, we can be sure that a preference for more compact plans is
designed to depend *only* on a prescribed score of compactness, and on no other, hidden factors.

The engine of our district-generation process is a Markov chain known as recombination, or
**ReCom**, which is fast becoming the standard in the field. We will apply it to plans built from
whole precincts, the smallest geographic units for which we have accurate, detailed electoral data.
Earlier MCMC methods for redistricting reassigned a single geographic unit (such as a precinct)
from District A into adjacent District B at each step, creating a new plan that agreed with its
predecessor on the assignment of every unit except one. (If Texas, for example, had 9000 precincts,
8999 would be kept in their districts in each step.) By contrast, **ReCom** typically proposes a much
larger change: at each step, two entire (adjacent) districts are merged and then re-split in a new way
that is completely independent of the division in the previous plan. This means that a single **ReCom**
step can reassign hundreds of precincts at a time. (Each of Texas’s 36 congressional districts, for
instance, has roughly 9000/36, or 250, precincts, so each recombination step performs a random
division of roughly 500 precincts into two new districts.) By iterating this transformation hundreds
of times per minute, the map soon loses any resemblance to its starting configuration.

A **ReCom** step merges a random pair of adjacent districts and splits the region in a new way.
Under the hood, each **ReCom** step uses a *spanning tree*, which is a kind of “skeleton” of the double-
district created by the random merger, and then searches for a place to cut that tree to leave behind
two population-balanced, connected pieces. So, by construction, recombination can only propose
new plans that are contiguous and maintain the desired population balance. What is less obvious
is that **ReCom**’s use of spanning trees also places an automatic priority on districts that have more
internal adjacencies: so *compactness*, or a preference for plump, regular forms over thin necks or
stringy appendages, is also “baked in” to the algorithm (see Figure 2) and does not have to be set
as a manual choice by the programmer (*DeFord, Duchin and Solomon, 2019*). In fact, when the
district boundaries of a plan generated by **ReCom** look ragged to the eye, it is often because the
building-block units themselves (such as precincts) have jagged edges.

![Figure 2: If all contiguous, population-balanced plans were made equally likely, the compact plans (left) would be enormously outnumbered by bizarrely noncompact ones (right). The **ReCom** algorithm prefers the compact one, with a relative weight dictated *only* by its compactness score.](image)

Over thousands or millions of iterations, this simple method can systematically explore the
universe of possible plans subject to population balance, contiguity, and reasonable compactness.
We will call a set of plans collected in a recombination chain a *neutral ensemble* of plans.

Additional features and constraints can be incorporated into **ReCom** either with hard thresholds
(i.e., validity checks) or by using probabilistic acceptance. To illustrate this, consider the traditional
districting principle that counties should be kept intact when practicable. We could enforce a
maximum allowable number of county splits by adding an instruction to automatically reject any
proposed plans that exceed some level of county-splitting as invalid, creating a constrained neutral ensemble. A different option would be to impose a bias to the probability of acceptance, essentially flipping a weighted coin each time a proposal is generated that makes it rare but not impossible to accept plans with a large number of splits. This would create a biased (or tilted) ensemble favoring fewer county splits.

When a proposed plan is rejected, a new plan is proposed by merging and re-splitting a freshly chosen pair of adjacent districts. This continues until some proposed plan passes the necessary tests to be accepted, at which point it is added to our ensemble. The next step proceeds from this newly accepted map, and so on until the Markov chain reaches its stopping condition (such as by collecting a prescribed number of plans). Our ensembles contain every valid plan rather than sub-sampling, or thinning out by accepting only every 1000th or 10,000th plan as previous authors have done (Herschlag et al., 2020; Fifield et al., 2020). The long-range statistical properties are the same whether we use continuous sampling or sub-sampling, and we employ standard convergence heuristics from the scientific computing literature to provide evidence that our chains are run long enough for the statistics we collect to approach stationarity.\footnote{Markov chains that take large steps, like ReCom, require many fewer steps to achieve approximate independence than methods that iterate very small changes. Gathering effective ensembles without sub-sampling is one more way to reduce unnecessary parameter choices by the modeler.}

For more information about recombination and for comparisons to other methods, see (DeFord, Duchin and Solomon, 2019; Becker and Solomon, 2020; DeFord and Duchin, 2020; Cannon, Duchin, Randall and Rule, 2020).

\section{4.2 Preparing data}

\subsection{4.2.1 Electoral data}

We will require a cleaned precinct shapefile for the state, with election returns and demographic data joined to those precincts.\footnote{Shapefiles are a file format that stores data about the position and attributes of a geographic unit, such as a precinct.} This can be difficult to obtain because precincts change from year to year and a longitudinal precinct shapefile is needed for the span of years covered by the election dataset. Furthermore, we may need to clean the precinct shapes to get suitable topology: to be usable as building blocks for plans, precincts must tile the state, with every resident located in one and only one precinct and no gaps between precincts.

The shapefile allows us to match reported vote totals to geographic units and to record which pairs of precincts are adjacent, which will be needed to ensure that districts are contiguous. For each precinct, we have joined data on total population from the 2010 decennial census, adult citizen population by race and ethnicity from the American Community Survey (ACS) five-year rolling estimates ending in each election year, and counts of votes received by each candidate for statewide election in a large set of primary and general elections.

Although our modeling concern is with districted elections for Congress and state legislatures, our analysis is based primarily on statewide (exogenous) contests. This is because the choices facing voters in districted elections vary across the state: in any given election year, some districts are uncontested, some have strong incumbents or other idiosyncrasies. When district boundaries are moved to create alternative plans, the newly proposed districts will be composed of voters who faced completely different candidate choices. It is not clear how votes for one candidate would translate to votes for a different candidate. By contrast, statewide elections allow us to make apples-to-apples comparisons across different parts of the state, since the same set of candidates competed everywhere. Ideally, we would include all statewide contests for the last ten years, but this is not always possible because of data availability and precinct instability. As we will discuss...
further below, this protocol is not intended for use with fewer than five general elections, grouped with the primaries (and, where applicable, primary runoffs) that preceded them.

Because our main concern here is whether minority-preferred candidates are ultimately elected to office, we link the primary (and primary runoff) for a given office in a given year to the general election for that same office that same year, and define success by whether the candidate who was minority-preferred in the primary succeeded in all stages of the electoral process.

We use a simplified set of racial groups: every person who identified as Hispanic/Latino on the census or ACS is classified as Latino. We use the term Black for non-Hispanic respondents who selected Black as their single racial category, and we use White similarly. All other respondents (those selecting two or more races, Asian-American, Native American, and so on) are grouped together and designated as Other. In a state with only one sizable minority group, all other minority groups may be merged into the Other category for purposes of VRA analysis. Citizen voting-age population is denoted by CVAP, and we use HCVAP, BCVAP, WCVAP, and OCVAP to denote Hispanic/Latino, Black, White, and Other CVAP. We focus on Latino and Black voters as minority groups because our main case study involves statewide redistricting in Texas. In other states, like California, Hawaii, or Alaska, or in certain local districting projects, we might specify different racial groups for analysis.

Importantly, we make no prior assumptions about whether the voting behavior of Latino, Black, or Other groups will align. This is a case-by-case empirical question addressed with statistical inference.

4.2.2 Candidates of choice

As explained above, the linchpin of a vote-dilution claim under the VRA is the right to replace districts where minority-preferred candidates usually lose with districts where they have a realistic opportunity to win, so long as they “pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground” (Johnson v. De Grandy, 1994, 1020). To assess whether a district falls into the former category or the latter requires determining which candidates are preferred by members of each sizable minority group.

Because vote totals are not reported by racial group, we cannot directly determine which candidates are minority-preferred. Instead, this falls under the umbrella of ecological inference (EI). Voting preferences are never monolithic, but techniques for measuring racial polarization have been refined for decades, and they can help us estimate the degree of bloc voting. The techniques in the ecological-inference family, like all statistical-inference methods in the presence of missing data, give imperfect and uncertain answers (Elmendorf, Quinn and Abrajano, 2016). It is fundamentally important to estimate the error that is produced by techniques and keep track of how it compounds or cancels out in our high-level conclusions. As much as possible, we will opt to make gradated and not bright-line determinations from the outputs of EI.

Our VRA-conscious ensemble protocol requires identifying the candidate who was preferred by each racial group in each election, together with confidence measures that these preferred candidates are correctly identified. To perform the check for minority control of a district, as well as to identify district-wide candidates of choice for newly proposed districts, we make use of not only statewide but also precinct-level vote estimates by race for each candidate (with variance estimates). Users can employ various methods to generate these estimates (e.g., using King’s EI, Ecological Regression, exit polls, or voter files). Notably, this allows our protocol to immediately incorporate any future advances in inference techniques.

In the implementation described here, we generate these estimates using a version of King’s EI, specifically the ei.MD.bayes function from eiPack (Lau, Moore and Kellermann, 2020) which is based on the hierarchical Multinomial Dirichlet model for $R \times C$ tables proposed in (King, Rosen
and Tanner, 1999). For each election we run EI at the statewide level, using precinct-level input tables. The inputs for each precinct are the row and column sums for the $R \times C$ table of vote counts. The row sums correspond to the precinct’s estimated number of adult citizens in each racial group (HCVAP, BCVAP, WCVAP, and OCVAP). The column sums are the precinct’s vote totals for each candidate as well as a None count, which is the sum of the four CVAP figures minus the sum of the recorded vote totals for all candidates, estimating the number of nonvoters. EI then infers values for the internal cells of these tables, i.e., estimated vote counts by racial group and candidate. Inclusion of the None column allows the underlying model to estimate differential turnout by race; without this, EI would rely on the unrealistic assumption that adult citizens from all demographic groups were equally likely to have cast a ballot.

Each EI run generates a large random sample of estimated precinct vote counts; we can sum these across the entire state to get statewide estimates. For each racial group, the candidate with the highest average estimated vote total for a given election is identified as the group’s “candidate of choice.” For a measure of confidence that Candidate X was the candidate of choice for a racial group in a given election, we first take repeated draws from the EI distribution and record the frequency with which X receives the most votes from that group. We then transform this to a confidence score.\footnote{\textit{Let }$p$\textit{ be the frequency in a batch of trials with which X is observed to be the preferred candidate. We logistically transform this to a confidence score using }$C(p) = 1/(1 + \exp(18 - 26p))$\textit{ for use when we build a score of district effectiveness (see Table 1 below). The purpose of the transformation is that an election in which the draws have Candidate X ahead only 50% of the time should receive almost no weight (because it is a toss-up); but if Candidate X comes out ahead in, say, 85% of elections, the confidence should be nearly 100%. The parameters 18 and 26 were chosen to give }$C(p)$\textit{ these properties. It is certainly possible to skip this step and just use }$C(p) = p$\textit{ as a measure of confidence, or even to forgo confidence altogether. But without this factor the resulting score will have more noise due to cases where the candidate of choice is uncertain. If we do not strongly down-weight the uncertain elections, just rerunning the EI could easily produce a significantly different answer.}}

Below, we will refer to district-level EI estimates as we build scores of district effectiveness. This requires some thought because of the computational cost of any calculation that occurs while the algorithm runs, rather than being performed in advance. It is not feasible to rerun EI to determine district-level candidate preferences with each newly proposed plan in a ReCom chain. We need a highly efficient calculation to retrieve both a point estimate and an estimated confidence level when a new district is formed. To handle this, we make use of the hierarchical structure of EI. The EI algorithm generates large random samples for each precinct from the distribution of possibilities produced by the underlying Bayesian model. This means that we can store outputs for each precinct in the state. Ideally, we would save the full detailed histogram describing the frequency with which various vote counts were estimated for each candidate and racial group in that precinct. Because this is too much information to store, we instead record the point estimate for each group’s support of each candidate in addition to a simplified coarse histogram of vote counts, compressed down to just nine values. During the run of the ReCom Markov chain, we can re-draw samples from these coarse distributions and aggregate to the district level for each newly generated plan to determine the confidence that we have correctly identified candidates of choice. The re-draws from the coarse histograms recover the shape of the detailed histogram with remarkable fidelity, as shown in Supplement A.

### 4.3 Building raw scores of district effectiveness

We will lay out three ways to use prior election results in assigning a minority-effectiveness score to a proposed district: an unweighted score, a score that weights elections based on statewide voting patterns, and a score that weights elections based on voting patterns restricted to the
proposed district itself. We will denote these scores by \( s_{\text{unw}} \), \( s_{\text{state}} \), and \( s_{\text{dist}} \), respectively. Although election-weighting schemes differ across the three effectiveness scores, each score captures the same underlying idea: the effectiveness of a district for a minority group is keyed to the district’s history of voting for minority-preferred candidates running for statewide offices. Importantly, because our districts are built from whole precincts and we have prior election results matched to those precincts, no statistical inference is required to determine which candidate prevailed in each district. We simply total up the votes cast in the district for each candidate and note which candidate got the most support.

First, we need to settle on the meaning of a successful outcome for the voters of a minority group in a particular election and district. If the candidate of choice from the primary does not advance to the runoff or general, then the outcome of the general is less informative with respect to the group’s preferences. Therefore, we group elections by pairing primary and general (or grouping primary–runoff–general if applicable) as Table 3 illustrates for our Texas case study. A successful election is one in which the minority-preferred candidate in the primary prevailed in both (or all three) elections in the grouping.\(^{12}\)

Our weighting scheme addresses the probative value of each statewide election in determining minority effectiveness. The unweighted score treats each election equally; no election is considered more probative than any other in determining a district’s effectiveness. By contrast, the statewide weighted score \( s_{\text{state}} \) and the district weighted score \( s_{\text{dist}} \) treat some statewide elections as more probative than others and weight them accordingly. The first three weights are election weighting factors that fall on a scale from zero to one. Their product is the final weight for an election. The fourth, a group-control factor, is applied only to elections won by the candidate of choice.

- **Recency.** More recent elections are given greater weight.
- **Clear candidate of choice.** As described above in Section 4.2.2, our ecological-inference outputs come with estimates of the probability that the minority-preferred candidate in the primary election has been correctly identified. Translating this to a confidence that EI has identified the correct candidate gives a weight that is higher for elections in which the minority group has a clearly preferred candidate.
- **Group member preferred.** We place greater weight on elections in which the minority-preferred candidate is a member of the particular minority group.
- **Group control.** This factor measures how much the outcomes in a district’s primary elections are controlled (and not just influenced) by the preferences of the minority group.

The factors used to build the scores in the current Article are summarized in Table 1 and we can now make them precise. We will discount elections for each year of age by a multiplicative factor of \( 2^{1/4} \approx .841 \), so that if any one election is four years older than another, it weighs half as much. The confidence that we have correctly identified the minority-preferred candidate is the same confidence score described above (see footnote 11), using draws at the state level for \( s_{\text{state}} \) and drawing from the district-level coarse histogram for \( s_{\text{dist}} \). When gauging Latino effectiveness, we place twice as much weight on elections in which the Latino-preferred candidate is Latino; and the

\(^{12}\)To be precise, suppose the primary candidate of choice is Candidate X and the runoff candidate of choice is Candidate Y. Then there are three cases we count as primary success. Case one: X won the primary (in the district) and there was no runoff. Case two: X received over 50% of the vote in the primary (in the district), whether or not there was a runoff. Case three: X ranked first or second in the primary (in the district) and Y won the runoff (in the district). An election set that meets one of these primary-success conditions and in which the minority-preferred nominee wins the general election in the district is counted as a successful election in the scores below.
Table 1: The four contributing factors for the unweighted, statewide, and district-based effectiveness scores (\(s^{unw}\), \(s^{state}\), and \(s^{dist}\), respectively). All of these are computed with respect to the primary election in an election set, because the runoff and general may not contain the most-preferred candidate for the minority group. Here, Candidate X represents the minority group’s candidate of choice. The first three factors will be combined into an election-weighting term \(w\) for all elections in the dataset, and the last factor \(c\) will be applied to elections won by the minority-preferred candidate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score/Factor</th>
<th>Recent</th>
<th>Clear candidate of choice</th>
<th>Group member preferred</th>
<th>Group control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unweighted ((s^{unw}))</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted/Statewide ((s^{state}))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Most recent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence from statewide EI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.841 1 year prev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.707 2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.595 3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.500 4 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.421 5 years, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted/District ((s^{dist}))</td>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence from district-level EI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) X belongs to group,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group votes for X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.5 otherwise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total votes for X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The four contributing factors for the unweighted, statewide, and district-based effectiveness scores (\(s^{unw}\), \(s^{state}\), and \(s^{dist}\), respectively). All of these are computed with respect to the primary election in an election set, because the runoff and general may not contain the most-preferred candidate for the minority group. Here, Candidate X represents the minority group’s candidate of choice. The first three factors will be combined into an election-weighting term \(w\) for all elections in the dataset, and the last factor \(c\) will be applied to elections won by the minority-preferred candidate.

The four factors incorporated here are important for the legal interpretation we intend. More recent elections are up-weighted because the predictive value of election results tends to erode over time, as older voters pass away, younger citizens reach voting age, immigrants are naturalized, people move into or out of the district, and voters change their political preferences and behaviors. Confidence in correctly identifying candidates of choice is clearly pertinent, because a wrongly identified candidate of choice undermines all subsequent conclusions we will draw. Elections where the minority-preferred candidate belongs to the minority group in question are up-weighted because they are more probative: in the words of the late Judge Richard Arnold, the VRA’s guarantee of equal opportunity is not met when “[c]andidates favored by [a minority group] can win, but only if the candidates are white” (Smith v. Clinton, 1988, 1318). And finally, the fraction of

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\(^{13}\) Alternatively, the modeler could set the group-control factor as the minority group’s share of the district’s CVAP; the group’s estimated share of the district’s Democratic primary electorate; or the estimated group votes for the minority-preferred candidate divided by the total votes for all candidates.
a successful minority-preferred candidate’s electoral support that comes from a specific minority group is relevant for two reasons. First, Section 2 of the VRA focuses on a minority group’s ability to play a controlling or “decisive ... role in the electoral process” and not merely one of “influence” (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 446 (plurality opinion) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Second, because Section 2 protects the voting rights of a minority group’s individual members, a mapmaker facing a choice between two demographically distinct districts that are equally likely to elect minority-preferred candidates might reasonably prefer a district with a larger minority constituency over an alternative district where fewer minority citizens will ultimately be represented by an individual of their choice.

We now have all the ingredients for the raw effectiveness score for a given district and racial group, multiplying the first three factors above to get a weight \( w \) for each election and district, and applying the group-control factor \( c \) to successful elections. Each effectiveness score is computed similarly:

\[
\text{score of district } D = s(D) = \frac{\sum_{E \in E} w \cdot c \cdot \delta}{\sum_{E \in E} w} = \frac{\text{sum of weight times control over successful elections}}{\text{total weight of all elections}},
\]

where the sums range over the election sets \( E \) in our dataset \( \mathcal{E} \), the weight \( w \) is produced by multiplying the first three factors (discounting elections that are older, have a less clear candidate of choice, or lack a candidate of choice who belongs to the group), \( c \) is the group-control factor, and \( \delta \) is 1 if the minority-preferred candidate carried the district and 0 otherwise. This expression applies to all three kinds of effectiveness scores.

The strength of using an approach that centers on electoral effectiveness rather than demographics is that we do not make evidence-free assumptions about how large a Latino population is needed to nominate and elect Latino-preferred candidates, or similarly for other minority groups. Rather, we directly and empirically answer that question, by totaling up votes, district by district. Our direct, empirical approach is better keyed to actual minority electoral opportunities, and so also comports better with federal law. The VRA’s plain text does not equate a minority-effective district with a majority-minority district; rather, it demands an assessment of whether minority citizens have an equal opportunity to “nominat[e]” and “elect representatives of their choice.” And our empirical approach also respects the prohibition under the Equal Protection Clause against the predominance of racial-percentage targets when drawing districts.

4.4 Calibrating effectiveness scores

This calibration step is essential to our protocol but is fairly technical; we provide a sketch of the idea here but save a detailed explanation and several examples for Supplement B.

The raw effectiveness scores described above combine election results in three different, reasonable ways. Each score ranges from zero (never electing minority-preferred candidates) to one (always electing them). It may be tempting to talk about a score that is constructed to fall between zero and one as a probability, and to interpret a district with, say, \( s = .5 \) as having a 50/50 chance to perform for the minority group under consideration. To lend justification to this probabilistic interpretation, we use a calibration step to normalize the raw scores based on observed data from actual enacted districts (specifically, all congressional, state Senate, and state House elections in the last decade). This also helps ensure that, although the elections that are used in constructing the raw effectiveness scores are statewide contests, they are still calibrated against election outcomes in district-based elections.
To do this, we fit logistic regression models to past data.\textsuperscript{14} We think of the logistic transformation as taking us from the raw score to a calibrated score that best captures the observed performance of each congressional, state Senate, and state House district in the last decade. Each input (raw) score falls between zero and one; after applying the logit function we obtain an output (calibrated) effectiveness score still between zero and one, but now easier to interpret. We will reuse the same notation $s^{\text{unw}}$, $s^{\text{state}}$, $s^{\text{dist}}$ for the outputs, taking care to refer to the scores as raw or calibrated when there is a possibility of confusion.

4.5 Counting effective districts

To assess whether a proposed plan complies with the VRA, we will need to count effective districts, and not just report scores. We elect to define a Latino-effective (or Black-effective) district as one whose calibrated effectiveness score estimates at least a certain threshold chance of both nominating and electing a Latino-preferred (or Black-preferred) candidate.

This threshold is a parameter to be set by the modeler, and it may involve considerable discretion. One consideration may be the mapmaker’s level of risk aversion, since setting a higher threshold may result in a lower ceiling on the number of effective districts that can be drawn. A second consideration may be how particular districts in the status quo map have been characterized by judges and victorious litigants in prior redistricting litigation, or how they have actually performed in prior elections.

A third consideration may be the number of statewide elections in the dataset. For instance, the Texas case study below has 14 election sets, and we will adopt the threshold condition $s > .6$—that is, to be deemed an effective district, we require a greater than 60% estimated chance of nominating and electing a minority-preferred candidate. This is designed to give a buffer that leaves us confident that the district is more likely than not to perform for the minority group, even if the signal from any single election was misleading. If we had, say, only nine election sets, we could adopt a higher threshold, such as $s > .65$, to be similarly confident that a district will perform more often than not.\textsuperscript{15}

4.6 Assembling the ingredients to build a neutral ensemble

Running on a standard laptop, ReCom generates new TX plans at a pace of hundreds of plans per minute in the Python implementation in (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2018b), and runs about 40 times faster in the Julia implementation in (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2020b), depending on the size of the districting problem and the tightness of the constraints.\textsuperscript{16} The VRA-conscious protocol implemented here in Python (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2020a) reassesses district effectiveness scores at each step, which slows the process somewhat, so that our runs take about 35 steps per minute for the unweighted and statewide scores and about 15 steps per minute for the district-level score on a state the size of Texas. The speedup for a smaller state like Louisiana is roughly 2-3×.

\textsuperscript{14}Specifically, we tune logit curves $f(x) = 1/(1 + \exp(-ax + b))$ so that $f(0) \geq 0$, $f(1) \leq 1$, and $f(s_i) \approx \delta_i$ where $s_i$ are the scores of all enacted districts in all available elections and $\delta_i \in \{0, 1\}$ are the outcomes for the corresponding candidates of choice.

\textsuperscript{15}The case law itself does not tell us how certain we must be of district effectiveness. When analyzing Texas districts, we found that rejection sampling for effectiveness ran as efficiently at the $s > .7$ threshold as it did at $s > .6$, suggesting that a modeler could exercise considerable discretion in setting the effectiveness threshold.

\textsuperscript{16}To be more precise, we conducted neutral (non-VRA) trial runs on Texas, Virginia, and Pennsylvania congressional plans built out of precincts using identical machines (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 v2 @ 2.20GHz [Ivy Bridge, late 2013]), allowing only 1% population deviation of any district from ideal size. Over runs of various lengths and with various seeds, the Python implementation generates 3-8 valid plans per second, while the Julia implementation generates 120-320 valid plans per second.
The last question to specify our protocol is how to set the numbers of effective districts that a proposed map must contain for each minority group, to be presumptively valid under the VRA and the Constitution, and thus to be included in our ensemble. The first guide in answering this question is the state’s most recent, or “benchmark,” districting plan, which may have been in effect for up to a decade and either has gone unchallenged in court or has withstood legal challenges, including VRA claims. The second guide, discussed above, is rough proportionality, within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s important VRA decisions in Gingles and De Grandy: plans are frequently judged by whether the share of effective districts is similar to each group’s share of statewide CVAP.

Considering these issues, we will reject proposed plans that have fewer minority-effective districts than the benchmark plan; in other words, we will treat this threshold level of effectiveness as a validity check in the district-generation algorithm. For instance, if we are considering a single minority group and the benchmark plan has three districts that are effective for that group, then each plan included in the ensemble must have at least three effective districts as well. On the other hand, we would reject a proposed plan if it had so many effective districts for one minority group that it would relegate another demographic group to substantially sub-proportional representation.

4.7 Adapting for multiple groups

In a state with only a single salient minority (for example, Black voters in Louisiana, as discussed in Supplement D), a district’s effectiveness score is a single number between zero and one, representing the probability that the district is effective for Black voters. For a state like Texas, however, where both Latino and Black voters may raise plausible VRA claims, the effectiveness determination becomes more complex. It may be tempting initially to address these voting groups independently, by simply calculating a Latino effectiveness score and separately calculating a Black effectiveness score. However, scores determined that way could be misleading. Suppose a district was estimated to have a 50% Black effectiveness score and a 50% Latino effectiveness score. That could aptly describe a situation in which a district is always effective for either Black or Latino voters but never elects a candidate preferred by both groups, instead alternating from election to election. Or it could equally well describe a scenario where a district elects a consensus candidate preferred by Latino and Black voters alike half the time, and a candidate preferred by neither group the other half of the time. And of course there are scenarios in between those extremes, as depicted in Figure 3. Disambiguating between aligned and mutually exclusive success will help ensure that the plans we judge to be VRA-compliant do not secure effective districts for one group at the expense of the other.

To address this complexity, our scores have four components: first, effectiveness for Latino voters but not Black voters (abbreviated L); second, effectiveness for Black voters but not Latino voters (B); third, simultaneous effectiveness for both Latino and Black voters (Ov, for Overlap); and fourth, effectiveness for neither Latino nor Black voters (N). Since these four cases are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the components must sum to one.

Here, raw Latino-effectiveness scores and raw Black-effectiveness scores are calculated exactly as they would be in a single-minority-group state, without regard to interactions between the effectiveness for one group and the other. Neither-effectiveness is handled similarly, designating neither-successful elections as those where the minority-preferred candidate(s) lost, but without

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17Numbers derived from this benchmark may need to be adjusted if the state's demographics or the number of districts in a state's plan has changed (for example, due to reapportionment of congressional seats). We also note that this protocol can be run using a different map as a benchmark if there is reason to believe the current plan may violate the VRA or the Constitution.
Figure 3: A district may be effective for Latino voters, Black voters, both groups, or neither. The figure shows three different ways that a district could have a 50% chance of performing for Latino voters and a 50% chance of performing for Black voters.

We then calibrate each of these three raw scores individually, using the adjustment described in §4.4 and Supplement B. Having three calibrated effectiveness scores allows us to solve for the four individual Venn diagram components, which we can denote by four components with $L + B + Ov + N = 1$. So the first district in Figure 3 has $L = .5$, the second has $L = 0$ and the third has $L = .3$. For a district to be deemed effective for Latino voters, it should have $L + Ov > T$, where $T$ is the effectiveness threshold set in §4.5 (for example, $T = .6$). To be deemed simultaneously effective for Latino and Black voters, it should satisfy both $L + Ov > T$ and $B + Ov > T$.

In a state like Texas, with two sizable minority groups, we would examine effectiveness scores computed for the districts in the benchmark plan to observe its number of districts currently over the prescribed threshold $T$ of effectiveness for Latino voters, Black voters, both groups, and neither group. In this Article we denote these numbers in a four-tuple with the following order: (Latino only, Black only, Overlap, Neither). To be included in our VRA-conscious ensembles, a proposed plan must meet or exceed the number of effective districts for Latino voters and for Black voters, separately, while also meeting or exceeding the overall number for both groups. For instance, with 21 districts, suppose the benchmark plan has eight effective districts for Latino and/or Black voters with a (5, 2, 1, 13) split. Then we would require a proposed plan to have at least $5 + 1 = 6$ Latino-effective districts, at least $2 + 1 = 3$ Black-effective districts, and at least $5 + 2 + 1 = 8$ distinct districts overall that are effective for Latino voters, for Black voters, or both.

Surveying the protocol described in this section, the key to our approach is its close reliance

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18We solve for these via $L + Ov = \text{Latino effectiveness}, B + Ov = \text{Black effectiveness}, N = \text{Neither effectiveness}$, while $L + B + Ov + N = 1$. It is possible to end up with calibrated scores for Latino, Black, and Neither leaving no non-negative solution for the components (e.g., $L + Ov = .8, B + Ov = .65, N = .25$). In this case we treat the effectiveness scores for Latino and Black groups as primary and adopt the closest feasible Neither score (in this case $N = .2$). Adjusting the Neither score is preferable to asymmetrically adjusting the minority-group scores or seeking a simultaneous adjustment for both.
on detailed, precinct-level election results from both primary and general elections. We do not assume that some a priori demographic threshold will cleave districts that provide minority voters with realistic electoral opportunities from districts that will not. The approach is deeply empirical, focusing on whether a specific district, regardless of its precise demographic percentages, has a recent history of consistently supporting minority-preferred candidates in both primary and general elections. To quote Justice Kagan, our protocol is “evidence-based, data-based, statistics-based. Knowledge-based, one might say” (Rucho v. Common Cause, 2019, 2519 (Kagan, J., dissenting)).

5 Case study: Congressional districting in Texas

We applied the VRA-conscious protocol described in Section 4 of this Article to build 36-district Texas congressional plans.

5.1 Data

We downloaded the 2018 Texas precinct shapefile and statewide election returns from the website of the Texas Legislative Council (Texas Legislative Council, 2020). Table 2 shows summaries of the demographic data obtained from the 2010 decennial census and the American Community Survey (ACS) rolling average for the five-year span ending in 2018. (We used CVAP from ACS years 2016, 2014, and 2012 when assessing elections from those years.) While election data could be directly joined to the shapefile, we used the maup package to disaggregate ACS data from block groups (the smallest unit for which CVAP is available) down to census blocks and then aggregated the block-level data up to precincts (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2018). Total population and voting-age population (VAP) were collected from the 2010 decennial census; and because these data are available at the block level, they required no disaggregation and could be directly aggregated up to the precinct level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial group</th>
<th>Share of total population</th>
<th>Share of VAP</th>
<th>Share of CVAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>37.62%</td>
<td>33.61%</td>
<td>29.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>11.48%</td>
<td>11.36%</td>
<td>13.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>45.33%</td>
<td>49.64%</td>
<td>52.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.57%</td>
<td>5.39%</td>
<td>5.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total count</td>
<td>25,145,561</td>
<td>18,279,737</td>
<td>17,858,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Latino, Black, White, and Other shares of Texas residents by total population, voting-age population (VAP), and citizen voting-age population (CVAP). Total population and VAP data are taken from the 2010 decennial census, while CVAP data comes from the ACS five-year rolling average ending in 2018.

We then analyzed 21 statewide Texas elections conducted from 2012 to 2018, which are recorded in Table 3. These were all the statewide elections conducted since the last round of redistricting almost a decade ago—for federal and state offices, both executive and legislative, omitting only state judicial elections.

Ultimately, we eliminated from consideration 7 of those 21 elections (struck through in the table) because there was no contest in the Democratic primary, which in Texas is a critically important stage of the electoral process if minority-preferred candidates are to prevail. We were left with 14 contests: nine primary/general sets and five primary/runoff/general sets, where the runoff was
Table 3: The 14 election sets in our Texas data, and the 7 general elections that we omitted because the Democratic nominee lacked any primary opposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Senator</td>
<td>P/R/G</td>
<td>P/R/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/R/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Commissioner</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ag. Commissioner</td>
<td>P/R/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Commissioner</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
<td>P/G</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

conducted because no candidate garnered an outright majority of the vote in the Democratic primary.

We also compiled district-level data for the 36 U.S. House, 31 Texas Senate, and 150 Texas House of Representatives seats, including the race and party of the winning candidates in all elections from 2012 to 2018, as well as demographic data for the districts, for use in the score calibration described in §4.4 and carried out in §5.3 (Klarner, 2019; History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, 2020a,b).

5.2 Racial polarization and candidates of choice

The statewide results for general elections in Texas show a stark pattern of racial polarization. Across 14 separate contests in four election cycles, all three minority groups voted consistently Democratic, and White voters consistently voted Republican, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, this basic pattern appears to hold, to a greater or lesser degree, in every region of the state.

Figure 4: The highest and lowest point estimates for each racial group’s support of the 14 Democratic nominees in statewide general elections: White (15–27%), Other (69–78%), Latino (73–82%), and Black (84–89%).

No Democratic candidate has won a statewide general election in Texas since 1994. So none of the Latino- or Black-preferred candidates in our 14 recent contests prevailed statewide. But the vote patterns show that each of them carried a significant number of districts in general elections under the current Texas congressional plan and under every plan in our ensembles.

As to the primaries: a large majority of White voters in Texas primary elections participate in the Republican primary, while most people of color who participate in Texas primaries vote in the Democratic primary. In Democratic primaries and primary runoffs, we found a high degree of cohesion across demographic groups. Because all 14 contests were for single-member offices (like Governor), we focused on the one candidate in each Democratic primary who was preferred by each of the four demographic groups. In 9 of the 14 Democratic primaries and in 4 of the 5 Democratic
primary runoffs, the three minority groups (Latino, Black, Other) preferred the same candidate. Latino and Black candidates of choice are shown in Supplemental Table 7.

Overall, the great majority of Texas’s non-White officeholders are Democrats. Since 2012, there have been only two exceptions for Representatives in Congress (out of 15 Latino or Black members) and eight exceptions for Texas state Senators or Representatives (out of 83 Latino or Black state legislators). To see a full list of candidates of choice across statewide primaries, runoffs, and general elections, see Supplement C.

From the stark and consistent partisan patterns shown in Figure 4, it is clear in particular that the Latino-preferred and Black-preferred candidates in these elections were Democrats for all 14 statewide offices; and the same has held true in congressional elections. The success of Latino- and Black-preferred congressional candidates in Texas therefore has hinged on their ability to win Democratic primaries (and, where applicable, primary runoffs) and then win general elections. So, for VRA purposes, we can currently forgo analysis of voting patterns in Republican primaries or Republican primary runoffs in Texas.

Given the very high level of cohesion among Latino, Black, and Other voters in Democratic primaries and runoffs and especially in general elections, it might well be possible, for VRA purposes, to treat Latino and Black voters, or Latino/Black/Other, as a single coalition group (Campos v. City of Baytown, 1988, 1244–45). Our main analysis will treat Latino and Black voters as separate minority groups, but the same method can be adapted (and indeed simplified) for coalitional analysis.

We return to the question of regional variation in preferences to note that we do not need to run EI on small geographies to detect regional difference. For example, in the 2018 gubernatorial runoff, former Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez and Houston’s Andrew White are identified as the statewide candidates of choice for Latino voters and Black voters, respectively. But in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, Valdez carried both minority groups. That effect is visible in our EI outputs from a statewide run, because the hierarchical model works by computing distributions of support on each precinct. This lets us identify Valdez as the Black-preferred candidate in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex while White is seen to have carried the Black vote in the Houston area.

This illustrates that the precinct-level estimates from the statewide run, aggregated to districts, can tell us regionally specific preferences.

### 5.3 Effectiveness scores and inclusion criteria

In Texas, we have the benefit of seeing results from 33 separate contests (14 primaries, 5 primary runoffs, and 14 generals). To perform the logit calibration step described in §4.4, we used all congressional and state-legislative winners from 2012 to 2018. This includes 145 congressional contests (36 districts), 600 state House contests (150 districts), and 77 state Senate contests (31 districts), for a total of 822 data points.19

According to the most current CVAP data (shown in Table 2 above), rough proportionality would require 10.6 districts and 4.7 districts that are effective for Latino voters and Black voters, respectively, given Texas’s current congressional apportionment of 36 seats. We will round these to 11 and 5 districts, respectively. If Latino, Black, and Other voters were treated as a coalition, its proportional share would exceed 17 districts.

Using any of our three calibrated scores, Texas currently has 11 effective districts for minority groups at the 60% threshold: seven Latino-effective districts, three Black-effective districts, and

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19 This includes one special election for Congress.
Figure 5: The distribution of EI-estimated Black support for former Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez in the 2018 gubernatorial runoff. The Dallas-Fort Worth area, in northeastern Texas, is mostly orange in this map, while the Houston area, in southeastern Texas, is mostly purple. (The map’s gray areas contain few, if any, Black voters.) This shows that even statewide EI can find significant regional variation in a group’s voter preferences.

one district that is effective for both groups. Because our protocol focuses on minority electoral opportunities and not on partisan opportunities, Texas Congressional Districts 7 and 32—currently represented by Lizzie Fletcher, a White Democrat, and Colin Allred, a Black Democrat, respectively—do not meet the effectiveness thresholds for Latino voters or for Black voters under any of our three calibrated scores.

Since the current map has withstood judicial scrutiny under both the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause (Abbott v. Perez, 2018, 2324–34), we require plans in our VRA-conscious ensemble to meet or exceed that map’s level of effectiveness: so we require at least eight Latino-effective districts, at least four Black-effective districts, and a total of at least 11 districts that are effective for at least one of the groups. So, for example, a plan whose (Latino, Black, Both, Neither) effective-district count was (4, 0, 4, 28) would not qualify for the ensemble because it falls short of 11 minority-effective districts. In effect, this approach allows plans whose effective-district counts are (7, 3, 1, 25) or (8, 4, 0, 24), as well as plans that dominate one of those outcomes from the minority perspective by shifting districts from Neither to any of the other categories.\(^{20}\)

5.4 Basic results

In this section we first present evidence to support the claim that our chains of districting plans have produced VRA-conscious ensembles whose statistics have stabilized after 100,000 steps. We then look at how the statistics from these ensembles compare to an ensemble built with no consideration of race and to an ensemble generated with demographic thresholds as a potential stand-in for VRA compliance. Put differently, we compare ensembles generated by our VRA-conscious protocol,

\(^{20}\)Although a map with fewer than 18 or 19 Neither districts could potentially give rise to a Section 2 claim by White plaintiffs and thus merit exclusion from an ensemble, our chain runs did not generate any such plan.
Table 4: The population shares and calibrated effectiveness scores for the 11 districts in the current Texas congressional map that are labeled effective for Latino and/or Black voters. Scores over 60% have darker shading, and scores in the 50–60% range have lighter shading. Mark Veasey’s District 33 is the only one that registers as effective for both Latino and Black voters, though Sylvia Garcia’s District 29 is close. All 11 Representatives are Democrats.

which uses both racial and electoral data, with an ensemble built with racial but not electoral data and an ensemble built with neither racial nor electoral data.

We built five ReCom ensembles, by running each of the following kinds of chain until 100,000 maps are accepted.

(∅) No VRA consideration. Only population equality is an explicit validity check, since contiguity is required and compactness is weighted into ReCom ensembles by construction, so the algorithm does not have to be manipulated to produce reasonably compact districts.

(unw) Constrained by $s^{unw}$ effectiveness. Ensemble inclusion additionally requires at least eight districts over 60% Latino-effective, at least four districts over 60% Black-effective, and at least 11 total districts effective for one or both groups, using the unweighted effectiveness score.

(state) Constrained by $s^{state}$ effectiveness. (Same as above, but using statewide weighted scores.)

(dist) Constrained by $s^{dist}$ effectiveness. (Same as above, but using district weighted scores.)

(CVAP) Constrained by CVAP shares. A plan must have at least eight districts over 45% HCVAP and at least four districts over 25% BCVAP to pass the validity check.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{21}\)Recall that our VRA-conscious runs required at least eight effective districts for Latino voters and at least four for Black voters. To build a demographic-target ensemble, we searched for maps with at least eight majority-Latino districts and at least four majority-Black districts by CVAP. Initial attempts did not produce any such maps. We then lowered the thresholds to 45% for Latino CVAP and 25% for Black CVAP. While those thresholds are somewhat arbitrary, they do very roughly track Table 4, as well as the results of Section 6 shown in Figure 9.
5.4.1 Convergence heuristics and robustness checks

Neither ReCom nor any other MCMC method will work properly if it is not allowed to run long enough. In this Article we have used ensembles built by including every plan that passes the validity checks and continuing until 100,000 maps are collected. We used two kinds of evidence to arrive at the conclusion that 100,000 plans is probably sufficient: first, we have confirmed that chains of that length have aggregate statistical properties that are approximately independent of their starting points, or “seeds,” even when the seeds are quite different. This test is sometimes called the multistart heuristic. Second, for selected instances we have confirmed that an ensemble ten times as large has similar aggregate statistics. If any ensemble method fails these tests, the chains have not run long enough to reach their steady state. Passing these tests is not a rigorous proof of approximately representative sampling, but these are standard convergence heuristics used across applied statistics, where rigorous demonstrations of “mixing” (provably approaching the target distribution) are virtually never to be found.

For the multistart heuristic to have the highest value, we should choose plans that are initially very different and check to see that the ensembles converge to find the same normal range nevertheless. The first seed plan used for the multistart test is the enacted congressional plan that is currently in effect. To find two other seeds with exaggerated differences from the enacted plan, we turned to the Atlas of Redistricting project conducted by the politics team at FiveThirtyEight (FiveThirtyEight, 2018). Seed 2 is their Texas plan drawn to favor Democrats, which is visibly quite different from the enacted plan and of course has very different partisan properties as well. Seed 3 is based on their plan drawn with an eye to compactness scores and county integrity.22

For the ensemble using the statewide effectiveness score, Figure 6 shows that a detailed partisan statistic—the Clinton share of the major-party presidential vote from November 2016 across the 36 districts—gives roughly the same answers after 100,000 steps, whether the chain commences with the enacted plan or with either of the two other seed plans. Similar charts for $s^{unw}$ and $s^{dist}$ are found in Supplemental Figure 16. These are boxplots (or “box-and-whiskers plots”) where for each plan the districts have been sorted from 1 (the district with the lowest Clinton share) to 36 (highest Clinton share). The boxes show the values at the 25th to 75th percentiles, with the median marked, and the whiskers are set at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Colored circles show the initial values for the enacted congressional plan (red) and the two additional seed plans (blue and green). The aggregate data collected from the three differently initialized runs is broadly consonant: across the districts, the three ensembles have medians, quartiles, and overall ranges within one or two percentage points of each other, even when the seeds began over ten points apart.

Next, we turn from partisan statistics to a metric of district shape. A plan’s cut edges score measures district compactness. Specifically, the score measures the lengths of boundaries between districts in terms of geographic units; a plan with fewer cut edges has a simpler internal perimeter, while winding or elongated districts will have more units on their boundary, driving up the score (Duchin and Tenner, 2018).23 The seed based on the FiveThirtyEight compact plan has a reasonably good (low) compactness score with around 2600 cut edges; the seed based on the FiveThirtyEight Democratic-favoring plan is less compact, with nearly 2800 cut edges; and the enacted plan has by far the worst score, over 3300. Figure 7 shows that our VRA-conscious ensembles have remarkably similar compactness statistics after 100,000 steps, again regardless of their

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22 The FiveThirtyEight compact plan did not initially meet our VRA effectiveness requirements, so we used a heuristic-optimization run as in Supplement G to get it past the thresholds. Both FiveThirtyEight plans had to be transferred onto our precinct units with the maup package (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2018c).

23 To be a bit more precise, a plan’s cut edges score is the number of pairs of units (here, precincts) that are adjacent in the state but are assigned to different districts.
starting point, with around 2500 cut edges on average.

Beyond the multistart trials, we also checked the same statistics (Clinton vote distribution and cut-edges score) after 1 million, rather than 100,000, steps. We found minimal difference in the partisan or shape metrics when comparing the initial 100,000 steps, a sub-sampled 100,000-plan ensemble containing every tenth map from the set of 1 million, or the full million-plan ensemble. This raises our confidence both that the size of the sample is adequate to this level of statistical detail and that the length of the run is sufficient for convergence. Finally, we conducted slightly altered runs to confirm whether the general findings are robust to reasonable perturbations in the methodology laid out in §4.3, §4.4, and §4.5.24

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24We conducted the following tests: using CVAP share of the district rather than estimated share of candidate support as the group-control factor c; replacing the confidence term for correctly identifying candidates of choice $C(p)$ with the simpler term $p$; and dropping both the group-control factor and the calibration entirely. For CVAP-based group control, the changes to scores on Texas congressional plans were minor for both the enacted plan and generated plans. Changes also were typically small with the simplified confidence factor, but the scores became more unstable because outcomes with high EI-based uncertainty had more weight relative to clear outcomes, producing an illusion of greater electoral success on some reruns of EI. The logit calibration was valuable largely to correct for the reduction of scores by group control; we find that if we drop both of them, districts with significant shares of both Latino and Black voters are rated far higher for both groups than recent electoral history warrants. Finally, we confirmed that the rate of ensemble generation is similar whether the effectiveness threshold is set at 60%, 70%, or even 75%. Taken together, these robustness runs increase our confidence that each of these parameters that requires user choice is indeed doing work in constructing a stable score that comports with electoral history, but that some of the details could be altered without breaking the protocol.
Figure 6: Democratic vote share in the 2016 presidential general election in three constrained ensembles using the $x^{\text{state}}$ score, each starting at a different seed map. The dots show the Democratic vote share from the seed maps. Seed 1 is Texas’s current congressional plan; Seed 2 is based on a Democratic gerrymander; Seed 3 is based on a plan prioritizing compactness and county integrity.
Figure 7: The cut-edges score is a compactness score for the plan—a higher score is worse (less compact). These VRA-conscious ensembles are drawn with respect to the $s^{unw}$, $s^{state}$, and $s^{dist}$ scores, respectively. In each plot, the vertical line marks the number of cut edges in the seed plan (the chain’s initial position). A single ReCom move can change the cut-edges score by 50 or more.

5.4.2 Comparing ensembles

In this section we compare the five ensembles to each other, considering whether those created using our VRA-conscious protocol differ significantly from those created without electoral data or without both electoral and racial data. The answer is a definitive yes. We have already seen that the three effectiveness scores are similar to each other for the enacted plan’s minority-effective districts (Table 4). Using summary statistics, we can confirm that the constrained ensembles using the three scores are similar to each other as well. But the three VRA-conscious ensembles do not resemble either the non-VRA ensemble (which uses neither electoral nor racial data) or the CVAP-shares ensemble (which uses racial, but not electoral, data as a purported stand-in for VRA compliance).

Figure 8 shows that, using the $s^{state}$ scores, the non-VRA and CVAP-shares ensembles do not contain as many districts that are effective for Black voters as the VRA-conscious ensembles contain, and they fall so far short in terms of Latino effectiveness that the results are nearly disjoint. Indeed, maps from the VRA-conscious ensembles typically contain roughly three additional Latino-effective
and one additional Black-effective districts. (Supplemental Section E contains analogous plots for the $s_{\text{dist}}$ and $s_{\text{unw}}$ scores.)

Figure 8: The distribution of Latino- and Black-effective districts in a VRA-conscious ensemble (purple), compared to the non-VRA alternative (top, in green) and the CVAP-shares, demographics-based alternative (bottom, in orange). All are shown with respect to the $s_{\text{state}}$ score. Note the very modest improvement in effectiveness for the CVAP-shares ensemble compared to the non-VRA ensemble.

Table 5 is another view of the comparison. A significant share of the plans in all the VRA-conscious ensembles pass the demographic test set forth above, but vanishingly few plans in the non-VRA and the CVAP-shares ensembles pass our effectiveness tests.\textsuperscript{25} This suggests that Texas ensembles built without rich electoral data—or by imposing a racial threshold—are unlikely to reflect VRA compliance and might well contain far too many maps that violate federal law. And this problem likely cannot be cured simply by changing the threshold levels for the CVAP-shares ensemble: if the CVAP thresholds are raised, it will become harder to find plans with enough qualifying districts, and many effective districts will be missed.

\textsuperscript{25}That only about half the maps in the three VRA-conscious ensembles satisfy the demographic criteria implies that it is not uncommon in Texas for Latino-effective districts to have less than 45% HCVAP or for Black-effective districts to have less than 25% BCVAP. That fact in turn tells us that, at least in some parts of the state, there is significant coalitional voting between different groups.
Comparing the three score-based ensembles against each other shows some differences but also some alignment in the determinations of validity. We should not be surprised that scores that typically track each other within a few percentage points can fall on the other side of a bright-line threshold: if $s^{unw}$ is just over .6, it can certainly happen that $s^{dist}$ is just below that level. But the great majority of districts for which one score is over .6 have the other scores over .5, making them more likely than not to be effective for the group in question. About two thirds of the $s^{dist}$ ensemble would qualify for $s^{state}$ membership and about half would qualify for $s^{unw}$ membership. This provides a further reason to set the effectiveness threshold for ensemble inclusion at a level buffered away from 50%.

Considering all the evidence so far, we might ask whether any of the three calibrated effectiveness scores is to be preferred to the other two. Our determination is that all three scores can be useful; the unweighted score has the least claim of the three, because on its face it omits relevant probativity factors. Between the other two scores, we think that it can be valuable to consider both. The district-weighted score has more regional discernment and a more sophisticated incorporation of the error in EI outputs; the statewide-weighted score has a simpler explanation and still takes uncertainty into account. While results for different scores are not identical, this does tell us that the modeling methodology is robust across three reasonable ways of weighting elections to measure district effectiveness.

6 Learning patterns in district effectiveness

We have just seen that Texas congressional ensembles using demographic data but no electoral data do not resemble ensembles generated by our VRA-conscious, heavily data-driven protocol. But what about a method that uses both demographics and electoral data but in a limited way, needing only a smaller and simpler dataset? Often, scores that seem to be complicated by taking many things into account can be nearly perfectly replicated using simpler inputs. In our setting, we would like to see whether our seemingly sophisticated handling of dozens of election contests could be well approximated by pared-down district metrics. To examine this question, we now
model the nonlinear relationship between effectiveness scores and lower-dimensional combinations of demographic and partisan features.

In statistics and machine learning, numerous techniques have been developed to recognize patterns in data. **Classifier** models use training data to “learn” discrete labels (like yes/no effectiveness), while **regression** models “learn” continuous-valued assignments (like effectiveness scores), on the basis of features in the data. For our examples, we are choosing to classify potential Texas congressional districts on the basis of two kinds of features:

- **Demographics**, using Latino and Black CVAP shares; and
- **Partisan lean**, obtained by averaging the Democratic shares of the 2016 and 2012 major-party presidential vote, with the more recent general election weighted twice as heavily as the older one.

We begin with a neutral ensemble of 100,000 plans, then extract the districts from each to make a large dataset, containing 199,461 districts after de-duplication. For each district, we compute its statewide weighted effectiveness score $s_{\text{state}}$. We randomly separate these districts into training data (80%) and data points held back for testing and validation (20%).

![Figure 9: The top row refers to Latino-effectiveness and Latino CVAP; the bottom row to Black-effectiveness and Black CVAP. Two-dimensional scatterplots (left column) show a collection of districts drawn from a neutral ensemble, arranged by Latino or Black CVAP share on the x axis and partisan lean on the y axis, then colored by their $s_{\text{state}}$ score for Latino- or Black-effectiveness, respectively. The k-nearest-neighbors (KNN) method is “trained” on that data to infer approximate scores for all possible positions in the square (shown with the training data in the center figures and without it at right). The hatched areas in the center and right-hand plots contain no training data points, so the KNN estimates are less meaningful in those areas.](image)

We attempted several kinds of models. A **k-nearest neighbors (KNN)** model assigns a value to each point based on the k points in the training data that are closest to its location. This can
be thought of as a predicted effectiveness for districts that may be proposed in the future. The choice of $k$ is made by a validation step that attempts many different values and chooses the one that provides the highest accuracy.\textsuperscript{26} For the regression, the learned value assigned to a point is the average value of its $k$ nearest neighbors, while the yes/no classification is made by selecting the majority label among those neighbors.

The outcomes of two-dimensional KNN regression are shown in Figure 9. They show a complicated district-level relationship between effectiveness (color), Latino or Black CVAP shares ($x$ axis), and partisan lean ($y$ axis). If the effectiveness of districts could be captured with CVAP shares alone, we would see a vertical line dividing the effective from the ineffective zones. If overall partisanship were a good predictor on its own, we might see a horizontal dividing line; this is not the case, but we note that partisanship alone is more predictive for Latino effectiveness. If effectiveness could be expressed in a simple linear relationship between partisan lean and CVAP, we would see a straight line of some slope dividing the regions. Instead, we see a more complicated frontier with a large zone of ambiguity, especially in Latino effectiveness.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Figure 10:} KNN regression for a three-dimensional scatterplot of district effectiveness.

\textsuperscript{26}To be precise, we use $m$-fold cross-validation with $m = 10$, then choose the $k$ for KNN with the best average $r^2$ and mean squared error (MSE) over those ten-fold trials. Using those values of $k$, the final accuracy estimates use the full set of training data and are then corroborated against the withheld testing data.

\textsuperscript{27}Grofman, Handley, and Lublin (2001) studied what amounts to effectiveness classification in a similar feature space nearly 20 years ago, positing an “elbow” or V-shaped frontier of effectiveness. For a comparison of our classification results with their framework, see Supplement F.
Because Texas has two sizable minority groups, and Latino and Black voters tend to have overlapping electoral preferences, we might hope to do better by taking both groups’ CVAP shares into account simultaneously. To this end, Figure 10 shows the same kind of regressions in three dimensions: Latino CVAP, Black CVAP, and the same measure of partisan lean. These plots still reveal complex, nonlinear frontiers and significant zones of ambiguity.

Further pattern recognition results using various models for regression and classification are found in Supplement F. Together, these methods indicate that scores built from our involved electoral methodology do not easily reduce to combinations of CVAP demographics and general-election partisan lean. This leads us to conclude that electoral complexity, perhaps especially the dynamics of actual primary elections, is playing an ineliminable role in our determination of district effectiveness.

7 Closing the representation gap

Finally, we return to where this Article began: the underrepresentation of communities of color at both the federal and state level. The algorithmic techniques described in this Article can be readily reconfigured to point the way to maps that are likely to promote significant gains in minority representation.

Recall first that our VRA-conscious ensembles are made by imposing validity constraints rather than a bias: the proposal of new plans is made without regard to race, and the validity criteria are given by a threshold test, with no preference for plans that exceed the threshold by a wider margin. It is therefore unsurprising that this procedure does not on its own favor the creation of plans that greatly surpass the status quo in minority electoral opportunities. But—so long as districts are population-balanced, contiguous, reasonably compact, and constructed largely or entirely from intact precincts, as is the case across all our ensembles—maps that sit right at rough proportionality for all sizable minority groups might well be the ones that actually minimize legal exposure under both the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause.

By shifting to an algorithm that has a tilted acceptance function favoring increased minority electoral opportunities, it is possible in many states to create maps that fully meet (or even exceed) rough proportionality simultaneously for multiple minority groups. For example, in Texas we were able to create maps that are effective enough to typically meet rough proportionality simultaneously for both Latino and Black voters, while not “double counting” any districts. A heuristic optimization algorithm can preferentially accept maps with higher minority effectiveness. We carried this out with the general “short bursts” strategy outlined in (Cannon, Goldbloom-Helzner, Gupta, Matthews and Suwal, 2020); for details, see Supplemental Section G.

To be clear: maps proposed for adoption should be developed through human deliberation based on significant community input and a broader range of criteria and values than our algorithm incorporates. No map plucked from an ensemble is likely to satisfy all human desiderata off the shelf. But just to demonstrate that a map with eight Latino-effective districts and four Black-effective districts can be replaced by one with (at least) ten and five such districts, respectively, we offer one demonstration plan from an ensemble. The map itself is depicted in Figure 11, and its effectiveness statistics by district are shown in Table 6.

We emphasize that this map is not intended to be an ideal map. But it does show that a carefully drawn plan could be dramatically fairer for historically underrepresented minority groups in Texas. We call it a “demonstration map” because it demonstrates that the shortfall of minority representation in the status quo map can be cured. The failure to do so can be attributed not to geography or law, but only to line-drawing.
Figure 11: An interesting demonstration plan found by heuristic optimization.
Table 6: The statistics for 16 minority-effective districts in the demonstration plan; by contrast, the enacted plan has 11 (compare Table 4). Scores over 60% have darker shading, and scores in the 50–60% range have lighter shading. The number of primary and general elections won by minority-preferred candidates is shown in the last two columns. There can be a range of primary outcomes when different candidates of choice are identified; the candidate preferred statewide is used in $s_{unw}$ and $s_{state}$, while the district-specific preference is used in $s_{dist}$. The district-specific success rate is typically higher.

In Table 6, we have uncoupled the primary and general elections, to give a more detailed view of the electoral history of these districts. (In other words, this table shows the primary/runoff success independent of the general-election outcome, while our effectiveness-scoring system requires wins in both the primary and the general, to be counted as a success.) The table shows that under all three scores there are at least nine effective districts for Latino voters in the demonstration plan. District 30 is effective under the statewide- and district-weighted scores, adding a tenth Latino-effective district, and is very close to the threshold in the unweighted effectiveness score as well. Additionally Districts 18 and 23 are almost at our effectiveness threshold under $s_{dist}$. Four districts are effective for Black voters under all three scores, and additional Districts 17 and 35 exceed 60% in two out of three scores. Overall, the table shows 16 districts that are classified as Latino-effective or Black-effective, according to at least two of the three scores. None of the 16 is majority-White by CVAP.

Many of these 16 highlighted districts have demographics and effectiveness scores similar to those of the 11 effective districts in the current enacted plan (see Table 4). However, in the current enacted plan, only Congressman Veasey’s District 33 has HCVAP below 50% or BCVAP below 40%. By contrast, the demonstration plan presented here features numerous effective districts with lower

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<th>CD</th>
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<th>HCVAP %</th>
<th>Latino Effective</th>
<th>BCVAP %</th>
<th>Black Effective</th>
<th>WCVAP %</th>
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<th>14 Gen (Dem.)</th>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>16 17 19</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>12-14 10-14</td>
<td>10</td>
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Latino and Black population percentages. For example, in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, District 7 is a Latino-effective district with an HCVAP of only 33% and District 23 is a Black-effective district with a BCVAP of roughly 28%. We emphasize that each of those demonstration districts earned its effectiveness score by voting for the Latino- or Black-preferred candidates, respectively, in nearly every statewide election conducted in the last decade.

The use of a search technique tailored to raise the number of effective districts might lead us to wonder about the effect on the rest of the map. With respect to demographics alone, redistricting is a fixed-sum activity: there are only so many Latino citizens of voting age in the state, so building more districts with high HCVAP means there is less remaining HCVAP to distribute over the other districts. We might worry that we can only secure a larger number of effective districts by draining the opportunity for coalitional influence from the rest of the state. But this is not the case. Because of the highly nonlinear relationship between demographics and effectiveness (see §6), it is possible to create some plans with a greater overall effectiveness than others.

![Figure 12: This trace plot shows the expected value of aggregate effectiveness for Black and Latino voters (L + B + Ov summed over all 36 districts) trending up markedly over the course of a heuristic-optimization run.](image)

To see this, let us consider the sum of the effectiveness scores for all 36 Texas congressional districts. Because each district has a score between 0 and 1, the sum will fall between 0 and 36. To the extent that a group’s effectiveness scores behave like probabilities of electoral success, the sum over the 36 districts can be regarded as the expected value for the group in a given election. This expected-value score takes into account the probability but not certainty of electoral success in the effective districts, and also includes a contribution from other districts in which an effectiveness score could fall well below .5 yet still reflect real political influence and a chance for an occasional win.

The enacted plan has an expected-value score just under 13, driven by 11 highly effective districts. By the time we are 3000 steps into a heuristic-optimization run, the expected-value score is usually over 16 and sometimes exceeds 17, which tracks with the 16 effective districts identified in our demonstration plan (see Table 6).

We find that, with respect to electoral opportunity, districting is not a fixed-sum game. We can find plans that combine safe minority districts, likely-to-elect minority districts, and some minority influence districts in a way that is especially beneficial in aggregate. This is a departure from the
narrower focus on likely effective districts that is directly relevant for VRA compliance, but may still point the way to a more coalitional expansion of minority opportunities beyond the demands of the law.

8 Conclusion

The principal goal of this project is the design and study of a protocol for building ensembles of alternative districting plans, taking closely into account the law of race and redistricting. We do this by using longitudinal electoral data, one of a choice of effectiveness scores, and a constrained district-generation algorithm.

No inclusion criterion assessed by a computer could perfectly track the conclusions of a court (not least because of variation in the judiciary itself), but ours is constructed to give us strong justification for describing it as a representative sample of the universe of VRA-compliant plans. We have pursued this objective in a way that also avoids overreliance on purely demographic targets that might run afield of the Equal Protection Clause.

The structure of our protocol is described in §4, and a detailed case study for Texas congressional districts is detailed in §5. In §6 we confirm that the role played by the extensive electoral data is not easily replaced by simpler proxies. And in §7 we explore the use of similar techniques to minimize underrepresentation for minority groups—showing in particular that finding plans to cure longstanding underrepresentation is a markedly different task from creating collections of alternatives that pass VRA muster.

We have made careful use of error estimates, described our tests of quality for ensemble generation, and confirmed robustness of the method across reasonable variations in the steps. With a detailed case study in the large and complicated state of Texas, we confirm that our implementation lets us carry out the work on a time scale suitable for all stages of redistricting, from considering plans for possible adoption all the way to challenging them in litigation. By making our code and data public (MGGG Redistricting Lab, 2020a), we aim to make it possible for other researchers and practitioners to use this method on the ground.

This tool now makes it possible to assess proposed districting plans in racially diverse states against a baseline that takes the Voting Rights Act into account. The computational tools for redistricting are continually becoming both more powerful and more refined, facilitating the ability to create new maps that better meet our ideals of fairness and to understand maps in the context of realistic alternatives. By using novel tools in combination with renewed commitment to safeguarding minority representation, we can come closer than ever to the goal articulated by John Adams almost 250 years ago, in the midst of the American Revolution: to make our representative assemblies “in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large” (Adams, 1776, 108).
Acknowledgments

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Racial identification of candidates was made possible by a dataset purchased from Carl Klarner (http://klarnerpolitics.org/).

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Campos v. City of Baytown. 1988. 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.).


Iowa Code § 42.4.4. N.d.

Iowa Const. art. III, § 37. N.d.


U.S. Const. amend. XIV. N.d.


A Compressing probability distributions

In this appendix, we detail a method to record precinct-level probabilistic information in a condensed form, so that the distributions can be efficiently recovered at every step of a Markov chain. The strategy is to compress a histogram into octiles, storing only eight “bars” instead of dozens or hundreds.

![Figure 13](image)

Figure 13: Original (blue), compressed (red), and reconstituted (green) probability distributions. The model incorporates a turnout estimate by including “None” as a candidate. The reconstituted distributions reflect the original histograms remarkably closely, even though only eight histogram bars were stored in each case.

Figure 13 demonstrates the precinct-level EI estimation process for two precincts in Texas. This example comes from the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial primary runoff. The left plot (blue) shows estimated support levels for Valdez, White, and “None” (CVAP minus the vote for the candidates) by Latino and Black voters, shown with a detailed histogram in which each number of votes is recorded separately with its observed frequency for 1000 draws from EI. The center plot (red) shows the coarse histograms approximating the distributions of these EI draws, by binning them into eighths (octiles). In particular, by saving the values of the end points of each 12.5% interval, we can approximate the vote-count distribution by saving only nine values. In the plot, the vote axis is divided at these endpoints, and each bar has the same mass. The right plot (green) shows the samples re-drawn from the coarse histogram, performed quickly during a ReCom run.

The re-draws closely resemble the original samples, as shown by how closely the reconstituted
histograms (green) match the original detailed histograms (blue). Notably, this is true regardless of the shape of the distributions. By contrast, a common practice is to assume that certain types of random draws are reasonably approximated by normal distributions, which can be saved very efficiently using only two values (a mean and variance) and then easily resampled. But these examples show that vote-count distributions can be highly skewed (and in inconsistent ways), which would not be well approximated by normal distributions. With our resampling methods, however, we can recover a very close estimate to the original distribution from a highly compressed data format, without having to make any assumptions about the shapes of vote-count distributions.

Finally, we note that this kind of EI method does implicitly rely on an assumption of independence between these outcomes. That is, even though we recover the individual vote-count distributions, we do not attempt to recover the joint distribution of these counts across candidates. For example, a precinct-level EI draw that has a very high vote share for Valdez is likely to have a low share for White, but these interdependencies are not included in the model, which merely recovers the individual histograms.
B Logit adjustment

We first describe the logit adjustment for Texas in detail. For each score component, we calibrate the raw score with observed performance using logistic regression (logit) models. Specifically, we determine the raw scores for each district in each of the three enacted plans (congressional, state Senate, and state House), as well as the observed performance of each of these districts across all elections held using these plans. For example, in Texas, this gives us 822 data points for each score component (145 congressional, 77 state Senate, and 600 state House).

We label each of these district-elections with a 1 in the Latino classification if if the candidate with the most votes was either a Latino Democrat or a Democrat in a district that is plurality-Latino by CVAP and a 0 otherwise; and similarly for the Black classification. The Neither label is given by the complement of the union of those success conditions. We then use these classifications to fit a logit model using `LogisticRegression` from the scikit-learn Python machine-learning library, with an L2 penalty and balanced class weights (to account for the large imbalance in class size). The fit logistics are of the form $f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-ax - b)}$ for the $(a, b)$ shown here.

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### Candidates of choice in Texas elections

Table 7 shows the list of candidates for the Texas elections in our dataset, with the statewide candidate of choice marked for both Latino and Black voters. In the large majority of contests, these two groups agree on a candidate of choice.

Most statewide candidates of choice in this table are assessed 100% confidence because they came out ahead on each of the 1000 draws from the EI probability distribution computed in *eiPack*. The number of times that each listed candidate was drawn first is recorded in the table.

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Table 7: Texas elections used for analysis, with the statewide candidate of choice marked for Latino and Black voters. We record the number of times that the candidate got the most votes out of 1000 draws from the Latino voter-preference distribution, followed by the Black voter-preference distribution (for instance, in the 2018 Governor runoff election, Valdez got the most votes from Latino voters in all 1000 draws, while getting the most votes from Black voters in 429 of 1000 draws.) Only major-party candidates are included for general elections, and only Democratic primaries and runoff elections are considered. We have also excluded elections with uncontested primaries, as well as judicial contests.
D Case study: Louisiana

To confirm that the protocol here has applicability beyond the Texas congressional districts, we briefly report results from a second trial carried out on congressional and state Senate plans for Louisiana, which have 6 and 39 districts, respectively. Louisiana has 31.4% BCVAP, per 2018 ACS data, which indicates that a proportional share of effective districts would call for 1.9 congressional districts and 12.2 state Senate districts. The current map has one congressional district and 11 state Senate districts that are effective for Black voters.

Data preparation for Louisiana is similar to Texas, except that the precinct shapefiles provided by the State are less stable, and careful geodata-matching work must be done to produce a shapefile that can support longitudinal election results from 2015 to 2019, resulting in a smaller election dataset than in Texas. In addition, Louisiana has a nonpartisan primary (dubbed a “jungle primary” or “Cajun primary”) used in all but presidential contests; if no candidate surpasses 50% of the statewide vote, then the top two vote-getters advance to a general election (effectively, a runoff). Our dataset began with 11 election sets, with primaries paired with generals when appropriate. We excluded one election (State Treasurer in 2015) because the primary featured two Republicans and no Democrats, leaving us with ten election sets for use in the VRA-conscious protocol. Success for the Black-preferred candidate is assessed in a district when that candidate either (a) receives a majority in the primary, (b) achieves a plurality in the primary and the Democratic candidate receives the most votes in the paired general, or (c) achieves a plurality in the primary but there is no general because of a statewide majority for some (possibly different) candidate.

Other elements of the VRA protocol are similar to Texas, but greatly simplified by the need to consider only one minority group. Effectiveness for Black voters is computed with the same formula \( \frac{\sum wcO}{\sum w} \) described in §4.3, using the same election weight and group-control factors. A logit adjustment step is conducted to calibrate Black-effectiveness to the empirical record of representation at all three levels of statewide redistricting. An effectiveness threshold of 65% is now used, rather than 60%, to reflect the greater margin of error that comes with a reduced dataset.

Figure 15: Scatterplot of districts from a neutral Louisiana state Senate ensemble (39 districts), plotted by BCVAP vs. partisan lean as in the Texas examples. Data points are colored by the calibrated state statewide effectiveness score for Black voters.

For the congressional plans, we are easily able to produce a supply of alternative plans with one highly effective district and a second or even third potential “influence” district, while maintaining much better compactness than the enacted plan. In a state Senate run with our VRA-conscious protocol, we find numerous plans with 12 Black-effective districts.
E Convergence heuristics

We continue with additional figures in the style of §5.4.1, demonstrating multistart heuristics and ensemble comparisons.

Figure 16: Multistart heuristics for Democratic vote share in the 2016 presidential general election in two sets of ensembles. Top, three constrained ensembles using the $s_{\text{dist}}$ score, each starting at a different seed map. Bottom, analogous plot for the $s_{\text{unw}}$ score. The dots show the Democratic vote share in the seed maps, where Seed 1 is the current enacted Texas congressional plan.
Figure 17: Ensemble comparisons. Together with Figure 8, we see that the non-VRA ensemble and the CVAP-shares ensemble both have a median of 5 Latino-effective districts and 4 Black-effective districts according to all three scores. By contrast, the VRA ensembles medians of have 8 and 4 or 5 effective districts, respectively.
F Regression and classification results

In this appendix, we present further classification and regression results to extend the discussion in §6. We also elaborate the connection of our findings with the findings in Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence (Grofman, Handley and Lublin, 2001, 1430 figure 4).

Based on their empirical investigation, Grofman–Handley–Lublin suggested that an elbow-shaped frontier with two linear segments might be needed to cut out the effectiveness zone in a plot of demographics and partisanship like the ones we present here. One line in the frontier would ensure the composition needed to win a Democratic primary and the other would correspond to success in the general election.

The “joint” in their elbow was projected to have a relatively low minority CVAP and a Democratic share over 50%. On this account, the frontier for primary success should run “northeast” from the elbow because of the need for minority demographic control as a district becomes more Democratic. The frontier for general election success would run “southeast” from the elbow because greater minority share would help offset White Democratic defection if a minority-preferred candidate is nominated. Though the correspondence is not perfect, this comports fairly well with the patterns “learned” by KNN classification (Figure 19), especially if we recall that very few effective districts can be found below the square’s midline.

Figure 18: Three possible “electoral success” plots in the Grofman–Handley–Lublin framework, with Black population prevalence on the $x$ axis and Democratic partisan lean on the $y$ axis. Compare to Figure 19 below.

Figure 19: KNN classification fit to a yes/no label at the 60% effectiveness level for Latino and Black voters in Texas. Though the overall balanced accuracy is reasonably high, note the large number of misclassified points (false positive and false negative) compared to true positives.
Next, we present the results of decision tree models that find the best rectangular approximation of the effectiveness zone. This would correspond to a rough rule of thumb such as districts are likely to be effective if they are at least $X\%$ minority by CVAP and at least $Y\%$ Democratic. The classification model essentially solves for the best $X$ and $Y$ by using a balanced accuracy metric. The accuracy achieved here is unsurprisingly lower than for KNN classifiers, because the form of the frontier is more constrained. The interesting findings here, shown in Figure 20, are that a Democratic share in the upper 40s together with about 45% HCVAP or about 22% BCVAP are the best threshold correlates of effectiveness. (Compare to the demographic thresholds of 45% HCVAP and 25% BCVAP used above in §5.4.)

Figure 20: Decision trees fit to a yes/no label at the 60% effectiveness level for Latino and Black voters in Texas.

Finally, we include one more sample plot to test the hypothesis that district effectiveness is easier to classify if Latino and Black populations are combined. We find that the model outputs are markedly less accurate than for the racial groups considered one at a time.

Figure 21: With Latino and Black population combined, it is even harder to describe the pattern of effectiveness for at least one group using these features. (This finding holds up across various styles of regression and classification that we attempted.)
G  Heuristic optimization

Our goal for heuristic optimization was to find a map with five Black-effective districts and ten or eleven Latino-effective districts, while ensuring that at least 15 are effective for at least one group. Here, the goal was not to draw a representative sample from the set of all valid plans, or even from a subset of especially good plans. Rather, we merely seek examples of interesting plans. To do this, we use the proposal-generation mechanism of ReCom and insert local search optimization techniques with a specified objective function keyed to the effectiveness scores. Finding provable optima in a setting like this is NP-hard, and we emphasize that these short searches have almost certainly not located global optima. But we can still expect to find maps with good features in this way; the demonstration map featured in §7 was encountered in a run of this local search algorithm.

Suppose there are $k$ districts in plan $P$, denoted $P_1, \ldots, P_k$. Consider the piecewise function

$$g(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & x \geq .6 \\
5x - 2 & .4 \leq x \leq .6 \\
0 & x \leq .4
\end{cases}$$

Our objective function $F$ on the space of plans will be defined by

$$F(P) = \min \left( 11, \sum_{i=0}^{k} g(s_L(P_i)) \right) + \min \left( 5, \sum_{i=0}^{k} g(s_B(P_i)) \right) - Ov(P),$$

where $Ov$ is the number of effective districts for both Black and Latino voters and $s_L(P_i)$ and $s_B(P_i)$ are effectiveness scores of district $P_i$ for Latino and Black voters, respectively.

The objective function incorporates Latino-effectiveness across all districts and Black-effectiveness across all districts, applying the function $g$ to each so that scores less than 40% do not contribute to objective function value, the contribution rises quickly as effectiveness scores rise to 60%, and no additional contribution occurs after passing the 60% threshold. The effectiveness scores for the full plan are not rewarded past the level of rough proportionality at 11 and 5 districts, respectively. Finally, the overlap term is subtracted off to mitigate double-counting, since overlap contributes to both of the other terms.

For our optimization runs, the probability of accepting a newly proposed map $P$ if one is currently positioned at map $Q$ is given by the acceptance function

$$\text{Prob}(Q \to P) = \min(1, e^{\beta(F(P) - F(Q))}).$$

If the proposal to move to $P$ is rejected, the position remains at $Q$ and a new proposal is considered.

We iterate steps of this procedure, following the short bursts method from (Cannon, Goldbloom-Helzner, Gupta, Matthews and Suwal, 2020). To use short bursts, we choose a burst length of $b$ and run the chain normally in batches of $b$ steps. The map with the highest score in each batch of $b$ steps is used as the starting position for the subsequent batch.

We chose $\beta = 5$ and $b = 50$ after experimenting with different parameter values. After several thousand steps of this procedure, we are routinely finding maps with far more effective districts than are seen in the current enacted plan. (See Figure 12.)